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Societal Malaise and Ethnocentrism in the European 
Union: Monitoring Societal Change by Focusing  
on EU Citizens’ Perceptions of Crisis  
Wolfgang Aschauer ∗ 
Abstract: »Gesellschaftliches Unbehagen und Ethnozentrismus. Eine empiri-
sche Analyse der subjektiven Stimmungslage des sozialen Wandels in der EU«. 
During the last years a vague sense of discomfort with current societal devel-
opments is spreading all over Europe and is particularly affecting lower social 
classes of society. It seems necessary to theoretically derive new concepts of 
quality of society and to take these crises perceptions of EU-citizens more ade-
quately into account. In this article a new multidimensional concept of societal 
wellbeing is proposed to understand and evaluate new cleavages in societal em-
beddedness, social recognition and social belonging. It is hypothesized that those 
restrictions concerning quality of life are also mainly responsible for the rise in 
ethnocentrism and radicalization in many European societies. A macro-micro-
macro explanation of causes, characteristics and consequences of societal malaise 
is developed as a theoretical framework and also addressed empirically. As a first 
step, a cluster analysis of indicators of societal developments is used to justify the 
conceptualization of a highly diverse Europe. The empirical approach on the mi-
cro-level is based on two survey waves of the European Social Survey (2006 and 
2012). After testing the cross-national equivalence of the new concept of soci-
etal wellbeing, which is based on 14 indicators, the evolution of certain crises 
feelings in society is documented for several European regions in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis. Finally, separate multiple OLS-regressions within those 
regions were conducted to derive crucial factors which are responsible to ex-
plain ethnocentrism. It is notable that feelings of societal malaise exert a high 
influence on perceptions of an ethnic threat – especially in Western Europe. 
These value polarizations between social groups have to be considered as a fu-
ture threat of social cohesion. 
Keywords: Societal wellbeing, ethnocentrism, European developments, crises 
perceptions, malaise, European Social Survey, cross-national equivalence. 
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1. Introduction: The Necessity of Considering Societal 
Malaise and its Consequences 
Eight years after the financial collapse, which began in the United States, Eu-
rope is still in a state of crisis; we can even observe an accumulation of current 
challenges for the EU. All the critical events of recent years – the European 
debt crisis, the conflict in Ukraine, and the current refugee crisis – have led to 
the emergence of new divisions across Europe that threaten solidarity between 
EU member states and social cohesion within European countries. Such a 
breakdown in solidarity paralyzes the European Union’s ability to act in unity 
to meet global challenges. The extent of the refugee crisis took the European 
Union somewhat by surprise in 2015 and the crisis management strategies for 
combatting the tremendous challenges and consequences of present refugee 
flows seem to have little prospect of success. As a result, pessimism regarding 
the future of the European Union is on the rise almost everywhere in Europe. 
National governments find themselves in a dilemma where they must 
reestablish order (partly through the reinstatement of borders) at the national 
level, while at the same time they must negotiate general agreements to reach 
Europe-wide solutions. The European method of dealing with the crises is now 
strictly dedicated, on the one hand, to securing the external boundaries of Eu-
rope in order to maintain, on the other hand, the four central European free-
doms within. This two-step procedure (increasing the pressure for Europe-wide 
solutions that recognize national demarcations in order to restore a functioning 
Schengen Area as soon as possible) reflects the new strategy of the European 
Union to establish a “fortress Europe” (see Albrecht 2002). This concept of an 
externalization society (see Lessenich 2015) means defending our own liberties 
and life chances in a post-growth economic society by excluding and depriving 
needy people inside and outside of our borders. This new doctrine in a period 
of economic stagnation is becoming more and more socially acceptable. It is 
notable that the new politics of exclusion gradually undermine democratic and 
legal achievements and the central European value of solidarity, which is clear-
ly described in the European constitution (see European Commission 2004).  
The refugee crisis’ impact on Europe can thus be seen as the main driving 
force behind strained solidarity between and within the member states of the 
European Union, an attendant gradual exhaustion of democracy (see Klein and 
Heitmeyer 2011), and political and institutional alienation. New enemies to Eu-
rope are regularly identified by its citizens and populist politicians, who move the 
societal climate in certain directions. They accuse clearly defined actors, such as 
elites, banks or refugees, of being solely responsible for the current societal ma-
laise. This scapegoating strategy reflects citizens’ need to search for easy solu-
tions to complex societal problems. In particular, European bureaucrats and the 
political establishment in Western countries are blamed for precarious societal 
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conditions, which leads to the impression that Western democracies are facing 
a systemic political crisis (see Crouch 2008; Blühdorn 2013).  
Rapid societal changes, clearly visible as a consequence of the refugee cri-
sis, economic stagnation (in the aftermath of the economic crisis), Euroscepti-
cism and a lack of political trust, and the widespread insecurities of citizens 
(expressed in fears of societal decline) all lead in the same direction. These 
factors diminish solidarity and facilitate radicalization. As Zygmunt Bauman 
clearly states, “Postmodernity is a chance of modernity. Tolerance is a chance 
of postmodernity. Solidarity is a chance of tolerance” (Bauman 1995, 313). In 
his recent work, Bauman (2012) identifies the contemporary period in the de-
velopment of Western societies as an “interregnum.” The key promises of 
modernity turned out to be empty (Lyotard 1987; Habermas 1994) and many 
authors claim that widespread transformations in the economic, political, and 
cultural sphere have led to the impression that we are stuck on a treadmill (see 
Rosa 2013). Consequently, belief in progress fades away, capacity for tolerance 
diminishes, and solidarity is put under strain, becoming a “volatile tie” (Hon-
drich and Koch-Arzberger 1992, 24) between our highly individualized socie-
ties. There is the danger that vulnerable groups – as the victims of globalization 
– may influence politicians to turn the clock back to a period of national homo-
geneity and erode the principles of European collaboration.  
It is the aim of this article to view fears of societal decline, political aliena-
tion, and exclusionary attitudes as symptoms of one central development: a rise 
in societal malaise. The central concept of restrictions in societal well-being is 
introduced in order to explain new divisions in societal cohesion, social recog-
nition, and social belonging in contemporary Europe. The term malaise is de-
rived from medical science and describes general feelings of discomfort or a 
lack of well-being (see National Institute of Health 2016). But in recent years 
the term has also been used in a different sense to refer to societies that are 
“afflicted with a deep cultural malaise” (see Online Oxford Dictionary 2014). 
This second connotation of societal malaise encompasses latent feelings that a 
society is not in good health. Certain uses of the term describe visions of de-
cline, feelings of anomie, and a lack of political and personal trust (see Elchar-
dus and de Keere 2012, 103 et seq.).  
A theoretical model, which connects the causes of limitations in societal 
well-being (societal conditions in Europe at the macro-level), restrictions in 
living conditions and the characteristics of societal malaise (at the micro-level), 
and the potential consequences of societal malaise (such as ethnocentrism and 
radicalization) serves as the starting point of this article and presents a macro-
micro-macro explanation scheme (see Coleman 1991; Esser 1993) for potential 
future developments in Europe (see Section 2). This theoretical approach high-
lights societal developments in Europe, which increase divisions between cer-
tain regions of the European Union and threaten social cohesion within EU 
member states. In terms of the characteristics of societal malaise, it is crucial to 
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theoretically define certain dimensions of perceptions of crisis that have a 
damaging impact on views of social integration and societal functioning. The 
widening of value polarizations and the rise of the political right and left is the 
logical consequence of these precarious living conditions. The current trajecto-
ry of the European Union toward increasing transnational exchange is widely 
seen as a barrier to maintaining cultural homogeneity, protecting national inter-
ests, and guaranteeing social order. It is particularly right-wing populists who 
benefit by utilizing a “hard” Eurosceptic view (see Szczerbiak and Taggart 
2008) to justify their anti-immigrant positions. In psychological literature, Jost 
et al. (2003) provide a comprehensive cognition framework to explain differ-
ences in ideological outlook. People tend to embrace right-wing ideology be-
cause “it serves to reduce fear, anxiety, and uncertainty; to avoid change, dis-
ruption, and ambiguity; and to explain, order, and justify inequality among 
groups” (Jost et al. 2003, 340). We can therefore assert the presence of a rise in 
ethnocentrism in Europe, which can be described as a resistance to cultural 
diversity and an acceptance of inequality. It is assumed that this ethnocentric 
attitude is mainly found within societal groups who feel left behind in society 
and who are characterized by a lack of social integration or hold widespread 
views of a societal malaise.  
All three levels of explanation are also addressed empirically. A cluster 
analysis of crucial macro-indicators of societal developments is used to justify 
the conceptualization of European divisions, which lead to breaks in solidarity 
within the constellation of a highly diverse Europe (see Boatca 2010). The 
multifaceted dimensions of societal well-being at the micro-level are then 
quantified using public opinion data from the European Social Survey (2006 
and 2012). This multidimensional approach should allow the monitoring of 
societal change in the aftermath of the economic crisis in various regions of the 
European Union. The third objective of the empirical study is to provide a 
differentiated measurement of restrictions in living conditions to describe – 
together with the dimensions of societal malaise – certain driving forces of 
xenophobia. It is assumed that it is still possible to explain exclusionary atti-
tudes using socio-structural divisions and value polarizations, particularly in 
Western Europe. 
2.  A Macro-Micro-Macro Explanation Scheme for 
Contemporary Societal Challenges 
The theoretical approach, which is adopted in this article, systematizes and 
links approaches at the macro- and micro-level and can thus be illustrated using 
a bathtub model (see Coleman 1991). The guiding logic of this classical socio-
logical explanation scheme holds that social phenomena have to be explained 
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with reference to the micro-level because they are always influenced by indi-
vidual actions.  
Figure 1: The Macro-Micro-Macro Explanation Scheme for Ethnocentrism  
CAUSES 
Societal developments in the EU      Radicalization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Based on Coleman’s 1991 Bathtub Model. 
 
In this theoretical approach, contemporary societal developments (principally 
summarized using the three Is of political impositions, economic inequalities, 
and cultural insecurities) are seen as major factors that influence objective 
living conditions and societal well-being at the micro-level. At the individual 
level, it can be measured when current restrictions in living conditions, com-
bined with perceptions of crisis (which are conceptualized using the three Ds of 
fears of societal decline, political disenchantment, and social distrust) exert an 
influence on ethnocentrism (the dependent variable). A higher degree of ethno-
centrism within a society may thus be strongly connected to the rise of right-
wing populism and radical tendencies in Europe, threatening social cohesion 
not only within certain countries but also between EU member states. The 
theoretical model explains potential future developments within Europe, but the 
empirical analysis sticks predominantly to the micro-level. The hypothesis is 
that societal malaise is the dominant explanatory factor for the degree of ethno-
centrism and radicalization in many European societies. 
3. The Influence of Societal Developments in Europe on 
the Current Malaise 
3.1  Political Impositions in the EU 
When we review the political transformations in the European Union, the politi-
cal architects of European integration find themselves in a dilemma. On the one 
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hand, further European integration and common agreements are clearly required, 
since complex European challenges, such as the refugee crisis, can only be 
solved through joint efforts. On the other hand, the implementation of a European 
crisis intervention policy is often prevented by national interests and blocked by 
large parts of the population. Thus national governments – backed by significant 
parts of society – follow the “not in my backyard” strategy and favor independent 
approaches instead of European collaboration. As a result, EU bureaucrats are 
widely perceived as inefficient in providing sustainable solutions.  
In addition, optimistic advocates of a united Europe (see Münch 2008) have 
also expressed concern about further European integration. In a recent contri-
bution, Münch (2014) clearly states that the spill-over process from an econom-
ic to a legal then to a political union require a transformation of democracy in 
order to gain public support. The EU is mainly suffering from a large deficit of 
input legitimacy and is offering less output legitimacy due to the ongoing states 
of crisis of the past few years (see Münch 2014, 62 et seq.). Thus, during the 
last decade, the general “success story” of European unification has clearly 
shown signs of rupture. In particular, the Eastern enlargement of the EU and 
the deeper integration that followed to cope with the needs of a Union of 28 
members have encountered resistance from national governments and citizens. 
The finalité of European integration remains unclear and European solidarity is 
perhaps more contested than ever before.  
Contrary to neofunctionalist approaches, several authors (see Bach 2008; 
Haller 2009) consistently conclude that European elites have constructed a 
multi-level democracy that is not approved by European citizens. Haller (2009) 
highlights four developments that impede strong social integration in Europe: 
there is no common European language; the EU has no clear authority; there is 
no coherent European identity; and specific social structures in several Europe-
an regions result in groups of countries that are internally homogenous but 
highly diverse in comparison to one another (see Haller 2009, 287 et seq.). In 
connection with these factors, the positive image of the European Union has 
changed dramatically in recent years. In particular, the victims of societal trans-
formations see the opaque apparatus of the European Union as a sovereign 
association (see Lepsius 2006), which threatens prosperity and economic 
growth in certain countries or even destroys the life chances of some citizens. 
From the periphery of Europe, the EU’s center in Brussels is often perceived as 
a parallel universe, which is removed from the experiences of the people but 
nevertheless massively influences their way of living. As a result, Euroscepti-
cism is on the rise in many European countries as the aims of political institu-
tions and the perceptions of citizens drift further and further apart (see Immer-
fall 2000). Regarding the nature of Euroscepticism, it is important to 
differentiate between hard and soft forms of EU critique (see Szczerbiak and 
Taggart 2008). Whereas hard Euroscepticism principally opposes the EU itself 
and European integration, soft forms of EU critique reflect a high level of dis-
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satisfaction with EU policies, as well as a desire to improve the democratic 
deficit of the European Union. Empirical analysis clearly indicates that those 
who are better educated perceive a higher level of political efficacy and are 
more positive about European integration (see McLaren 2007). Since the be-
ginning of the financial crisis, Euroscepticism has become increasingly embed-
ded within European member states. It has reached the mainstream of society, 
putting high pressure on European elites in terms of how they determine the 
future direction of the EU (see Brack and Startin 2015). 
3.2  Economic Inequalities between and within EU Member States 
Despite the central aim of the EU’s policy of cohesion to reduce regional dis-
crepancies, inequalities between European member states have also started to 
rise again, particularly after the Eastern European enlargement in 2004 (see 
Fredriksen 2012, 18). The financial crises and their aftermath have dramatically 
increased the divergence between Northern and Central European states and 
peripheral Southern and Eastern European countries. The south of Europe was 
particularly hit by the crisis and seems unable to cope with high public debt 
(see European Commission 2013, 17). According to Bach (2008), political 
efforts to establish the European monetary union are a crucial factor in the 
increasing regional disparities within the Eurozone. Political actions were sub-
ordinated to economic rules, while citizens became more and more exposed to 
market dynamics.  
In one of his recent publications, Ulrich Beck (2012) highlights three de-
marcation lines for inequality within the European Union. The first division is 
between groups of countries with the common currency and powerful European 
nations that choose to follow an independent development path. A clear example 
is the United Kingdom, which tries to push its interests but remains largely in-
volved in common European decisions. Gaps between the wealthy countries of 
the north and the countries of the south challenge the European Union’s status as 
a functioning community of states. These new outsiders within the European 
project join the long-standing outsiders in Eastern Europe. Several new EU 
member states are still perceived as insufficiently economically mature to fulfill 
the economic standards needed to join the monetary union or insufficiently 
politically mature to meet the standards of established Western democracies.  
In line with Kreckel (2004), a center-periphery model is best suited to pro-
vide a framework for economic discrepancies between EU member states. The 
current European Union is a united territory characterized by concentration of 
power in the center and fragmentation of influence at the periphery (see Kreck-
el 2004, 42). Rising social inequalities reflect one general division, which wid-
ens the gaps between countries as well as within them. Comparisons over time, 
using the GINI index as one classical measurement of income inequality, con-
firm that inequalities have grown in most of the European Union member states 
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over the last three decades (see Fredriksen 2012). This is mainly caused by 
rapid income growth among the top 10% of earners, while the poorest 10% of 
the population are losing more and more ground. As such, privatization, deregu-
lation, and technological progress have mainly profited the wealthy. Citizens in 
the top social strata perceive new opportunities to develop their skills and may 
interpret trends of flexibilization (see Sennett 1998; Bröckling 2007) as present-
ing new possibilities, while the lower classes, who are often considered the losers 
of modernization, endure precarious work and unemployment (see Spier 2010).  
The economic tensions Europe is facing today have increasingly created the 
impression among the public that decades of social progress have come to an 
end and maximum levels of wealth have been reached. Growing inequality, 
which is in turn related to neoliberal policies that facilitate the process, there-
fore leads to strong fears of social decline that is increasingly affecting the 
squeezed middle classes in European societies. Reviewing the history of capital-
ism during the previous decades, Streeck (2013) proposes that the capitalist class 
itself has triggered the current renaissance in market dominance. They succeeded 
in reestablishing neoliberalism in the 1980s, which has led to a gradual erosion of 
the modern comforts of the welfare state (see Streeck 2013, 44). But it is notable 
that welfare regimes are historically grounded and seem to be somewhat resistant 
to significant cutbacks (see Schmidt 2010, 63). Research on the welfare state 
reveals notable discrepancies within Europe and strengthens the impression that 
Europe is a diverse family of countries. The most important work in this regard is 
the typology of Esping-Andersen (1990). His three worlds of welfare help to 
distinguish at least three types of regime within Western Europe. Liberal welfare 
states such as the United Kingdom or Ireland emphasize the role of the free 
market, while conservative welfare states (such as Germany, Austria, and 
France) are based more on the Bismarck model, where social security is linked 
to social status and employment relationships. The original aim of Beveridge to 
guarantee a universal security system for the whole population is more closely 
fulfilled in the social-democratic welfare regimes of Scandinavia. In those 
states, a high level of decommodification has led to the protection of a higher 
number of citizens from labor-market risks (see Schmidt 2010, 99 et seq.).  
Following Esping-Andersen, many researchers have tried to extend his ty-
pology to accommodate more substantial distinctions between European re-
gions. A fourth type of welfare regime has been suggested for Southern European 
states, which have been classified as rudimentary (Leibfried 1992), catholic 
(Begg 1994), post-authoritarian (Lessenich 1995) or familialistic (Ferrera 1996). 
Social benefits are strongly interwoven with labor-market participation, which 
leads to a lack of social security for labor-market outsiders (see Buchholz and 
Blossfeld 2009). Precarious groups in Southern European societies thus remain 
largely dependent on traditional forms of support, such as the church or the 
family, which strengthens the role of conservative family constellations, such 
as the male breadwinner model (see Keune 2009, 62). To establish a finely 
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tuned and comprehensive typology of European states it is necessary to include 
recent contributions on the role of the welfare state in Eastern Europe. Kollmor-
gen (2009) clearly states that Esping-Andersen’s typology is not able to integrate 
Eastern Europe. He instead opts for a further distinction of three additional wel-
fare types, arguing that the Baltic states demonstrate similarities to liberal welfare 
regimes, while the Visegrad countries, together with Slovenia, are best classified 
as minimalistic welfare states in line with the Bismarck model. The last group of 
countries is represented by the economic latecomers Bulgaria and Romania. The 
strong role of state actors and institutions are still evident in these countries and 
social security benefits only exist in a rudimentary sense (see Kollmorgen 
2009, 84). These insights in contemporary welfare-state research justify a theo-
retically driven distinction between six European regions (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: A Typology of Six European Regions Based on the Varieties of 
Capitalism Approach and Welfare-State Research 
 
Note: Modified and extended according to Schröder (2013, 59). 
 
The typology of six European regions combines research on different capitalist 
systems (see Hall and Soskice 2001; Hall and Thelen 2009) with current devel-
opments in welfare-state research (see Schröder 2013) and includes the post-
socialist welfare states studied by Kollmorgen (2009). It covers the 21 Europe-
an Union member countries that took part in the European Social Survey in 
2012. This theory-driven typology will also be used for cross-country compari-
sons at the macro- and micro-level (see Section 5). 
3.3  Cultural Heterogeneity between and Diversity within EU 
Member States 
The classification of six highly diverse European regions can be made more 
clear-cut when cultural patterns and differences, still prevalent in European 
societies, are included. Schröder (2013) highlights that variation in capitalist 
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systems and welfare structures go hand in hand with certain cultural character-
istics of the nation states. The prevailing ethic of Calvinism is – in his view – 
mainly responsible for the implementation of liberal forms of capitalism in 
Anglo-Saxon countries. Catholicism in Continental and Southern Europe has 
favored the development of social hierarchies and influenced the formation of 
conservative welfare states together with coordinated market economies. In 
contrast, the Lutheran influence in Protestantism strengthens the support for 
national solidarity, which has enabled the establishment of social-democratic 
welfare regimes (see Schröder 2013, 157). Even in Eastern Europe, the differ-
ent features of the countries’ welfare states are based on cultural and religious 
foundations. In the Central Eastern European states, Catholicism has main-
tained its influence, whereas the Baltic States were more strongly affected by 
Protestantism. The peripheral countries in South Eastern Europe form a third 
region, where the Christian Orthodox Church has prevailed, leading to a cultur-
al proximity to the Soviet Union (see Kollmorgen 2009, 83 et seq.).  
It is notable, therefore, that not only institutional structures but also cultural 
specificities have emerged due to historically grounded lines of division and 
center-periphery relations (see particularly Rokkan, ed. by Flora, 2000). The 
sense of a boundary between Christianity and Islam is deeply grounded in 
history and has long served to define European identity (see Belafi 2007). The 
tensions of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation and the frontiers be-
tween the Roman Catholic sphere of influence and the Christian Orthodox zone 
have created significant cultural divisions in Europe that still exist today. 
Boatca (2010) suggests abandoning the idea of a united Europe to alternatively 
propose an idea of a plural Europe that has followed divergent paths to moder-
nity (see Eisenstadt 2001). She states that Europe is still labelled a “moral,” 
geographical space, a morality which underlines European politics and intercul-
tural understanding. Orientalism (see Said 1995) is largely responsible for 
significant divisions between the West and the Islamic world and is also im-
portant for explaining the European strategy to unify Eastern and Western 
Europe. The East could be understood as a Christian region and was soon con-
structed as Western Europe’s Other and an incomplete part of the continent 
(see Todorova 1997, 18). Simultaneously, Southern Europe was gradually 
excluded from the European center due to the weakening of the Spanish em-
pire, its Moorish heritage, and proximity to Northern Africa. According to 
Boatca (2010), it is still possible to observe a prevailing view of Western Eu-
rope as heroic and superior (perceived as the center of progress and moderniza-
tion), alongside a decadent and nostalgic Southern Europe (characterized by 
loss of power), and an epigonic East (with strong ambitions to catch up with 
Western European standards of living).  
These historical roots of cultural heterogeneity still influence contemporary 
European discourse and impede the construction of a united Europe. It is obvi-
ous that political measures are always driven by economic prosperity and the 
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public mood. In times of economic prosperity, public resistance toward Euro-
pean integration will remain relatively silent, while in periods of economic 
stagnation and rising social inequality, criticism of the political establishment 
will gain ground. As long as the peripheral regions share the opinion that mem-
bership of the European Union is an economic and political path to progress, 
and as long as the prosperous countries do not view their European neighbors 
as useless deadweights, there is still hope for establishing European unity in 
diversity (see Haller 2009, 289).  
At the present moment, we are not only witnessing a breakdown in solidari-
ty between the member states of the EU, we are also confronted with the chal-
lenge of cultural diversity within the nation states and widespread impressions 
of Muslims as posing a threat to European culture. As a result, the Islamic 
population in particular is experiencing prejudice, due to perceptions that they 
are a backward culture, incompatible with the West. Islamophobia is on the 
rise, especially in the aftermath of various terrorist attacks within Europe and 
the refugee crisis; as such, Muslims are “no longer the enemy ‘other’ but are 
viewed much more contemporarily, the enemy ‘within’” (Allen 2007, 152). 
Due to key cultural clashes (such as the incidents of sexual harassment in Co-
logne), European states have predominantly decided to abandon the concept of 
multiculturalism and instead to introduce strict rules on integration, which 
often require the assimilation of immigrants (see Aschauer 2011). Civil and 
human rights are rapidly reframed in order to reestablish social order and intro-
duce new security measures. Language examinations, knowledge tests, and 
behavioral guidelines are on the agenda everywhere with the aim of enforcing a 
strong commitment to Western society. Due to these high requirements and the 
illusion of equality of opportunity (see Bourdieu and Passeron 1971), integra-
tion often fails and creates a new underclass of Muslim immigrants among 
whom poor educational performance, underprivileged positions in the labor 
market, and unemployment are widespread realities. All these developments, 
which have predominantly structural causes, are interpreted through a cultural 
lens, leading to a new form of cultural racism (see Hall 1989). It would be 
impossible to solve the integration challenge by simply intensifying the re-
quirements for refugees since they must overcome a great number of internal 
and external disadvantages when they start their lives from scratch in Europe. 
4. The Impact of Social Developments in Europe on Societal 
Well-Being 
Interestingly, although social integration was always a popular topic in socio-
logical theory, one that was addressed by various founding fathers of the disci-
pline (see in particular Durkheim [1897] 1983; Parsons [1973] 2003), an empir-
ically wide-ranging examination of subjective feelings in relation to societal 
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progress is largely lacking. However, many sociologists have contributed ex-
tensively to the theoretical foundation of the concept of societal integration. 
While some theorists (see Glatzer 2008) favor a broad conception of quality of 
life that encompasses objective living conditions (such as labor market integra-
tion, political participation, and social inclusion) and the subjective level, other 
authors refer more specifically to high levels of discontent (see Ehrenberg 
2004) and rising feelings of uncertainty (see Castel 2000, 2009) in Western 
states. It is thus important to also foreground the concept of societal well-being 
empirically, since subjective perceptions of crisis in society are often neglected 
in cross-national research. 
To clarify the influence of societal conditions on societal well-being, it is 
useful to refer to the dichotomy of system integration and social integration as 
developed by Lockwood (1971), and further elaborated by Habermas (1981) 
and Giddens (1990). System integration refers to the economic and political 
order (the integration of societal systems), while social integration refers to the 
individuals’ potential for integration. Nations may be considered integrated if 
both processes mutually enforce one another (see Heitmeyer 2008, 11 et seq.). 
According to the last section, gaps between system and social integration with-
in the EU arise as a result of the rapid imposition of political models without 
the involvement of citizens (see Fligstein 2008; Haller 2009), increasing ine-
qualities within (see OECD 2011) and regional disparities between EU member 
states (see Vobruba 2007), and the impact of cultural diversity in triggering 
widespread insecurities (see Bauman 2008). Some authors, such as Castel 
(2000), insist that strategies to cope with these insecurities depend primarily on 
the life situation of an individual and on socio-structural characteristics. Others 
authors (see Ehrenberg 2004; Rosa 2005) claim that widespread transfor-
mations in the economic, political, and cultural sphere have resulted in a seri-
ous overstress syndrome and have led to the general malaise of late modernity 
(see Ehrenberg 2010).  
The approach of the Bielefeld research group in Germany, led by Heitmeyer 
(see 1997a, b), aims to systematize contemporary restrictions in objective liv-
ing conditions and subjective perceptions of crisis and provides a sophisticated 
model to frame processes of social destabilization. According to Anhut and 
Heitmeyer (2000), the majority populations are also confronted with disintegra-
tion, which has led to states of crisis for Western societies. Economic difficul-
ties within nation states (such as rises in unemployment or high poverty rates) 
can be seen as indicators of a crisis in social structure. On an individual level, 
these crisis states are accompanied by expressions of fears of social decline 
together with feelings of relative deprivation. The crisis of regulation refers to 
the political level. Political alienation is manifested in low voter turnout and 
reduced political engagement. On a subjective level, these processes go hand in 
hand with low levels of political trust and clear signs of dissatisfaction with 
societal developments. Insecurities, resulting from global or individual threats, 
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can influence the social climate. In times when flexibility and competition are 
crucial trends, social relationships become fragile and may result in a lack of 
solidarity (see Heitmeyer and Endrikat 2008). These findings correspond to 
prominent theories of individualization (see Beck 1986; Giddens 1990), where 
the question of how the flexibility of individuals leads to new forms of social 
embeddedness is still unresolved. Theories of social recognition (see Honneth 
2010), social capital (see Putnam 2000), and the erosion of community values 
(see Etzioni 1995) are well-known theoretical approaches that address the 
challenge of reintegration in contemporary societies.  
Societal malaise should be described using three key perceptions of crisis, 
which are interconnected with economic, political, and cultural conditions in 
Europe: EU citizens express fear of societal decline, show increasing levels of 
political disenchantment, and react with social distrust to the challenges of 
cultural diversity.  
4.1  Fear of Societal Decline 
Within the European Union, social mobility is predominantly guaranteed 
through the meritocratic principle. The current conditions of the global market 
economy indicate that individual efforts to enhance one’s social status may not 
always be effective. Precarious groups at the bottom of society compete for 
scarce resources and experience the bitter reality that structural causes often 
counteract attempts at social advancement. The societal malaise manifests itself 
not only at the margins of society, where the potential of the precariat (Stand-
ing 2011) is widely neglected. The middle classes also face constraints in so-
cietal well-being, and are beginning to view the upper classes critically. Fear-
ing a loss of social prestige, they try to secure their wealth by excluding certain 
groups. The middle classes are often still able to achieve stable positions in the 
labor market, but they are increasingly confronted with their own vulnerability 
due to signs of economic stagnation (see Castel 2000). Consequently, although 
stratification research presently mainly deals with precarization (see Castel and 
Dörre 2009), it also focuses more closely on the vulnerable middle classes (see 
Burzan and Berger 2010), and is beginning to analyze subjective fears of social 
decline (see Kraemer 2010). It is notable that middle-class insecurities are often 
not connected with real experiences of social decline but based on individual or 
historical comparisons. People feel underprivileged in comparison to other 
groups or a previous point in time. Citizens in Western Europe often assess the 
“golden age” of the second half of the 20th century as an era of peacebuilding, 
economic growth, political stability, and European integration. Current middle-
class fears can best be attributed to changes in expectations for the future, as 
EU citizens seem to realize that European stability is illusory. Alongside the 
prosperous regions in the West, there are several trouble spots (such as in the 
Middle East); new conflicts (such as in Ukraine) weaken the European position 
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in global power relations, and new borders between the West and radical Islam 
(combined with the terrorist threat posed by the Islamic State) threaten social 
cohesion between Christians and Muslims. Fears of societal decline are reflect-
ed in high levels of pessimism for the future. It is important to distinguish 
expressions of fear among the middle classes from the perceptions of social 
groups who are clearly underprivileged. In many Southern European states we 
can observe a worsening of the lives of the poor, where restrictions in objective 
living conditions are clearly apparent. There is a big social question posed by a 
young and lost generation who are experiencing shortcomings in education and 
limited chances in the labor market. They try to survive with occasional jobs or 
are confronted with unemployment and material deprivation. These marginal 
groups in Europe are becoming more and more visible in certain regions and 
urban districts, which are largely characterized by a lack of prospects. People at 
the lower bottom in contemporary society all suffer from neglect and are ideal 
breeding grounds for radicalization. 
4.2  Political Disenchantment 
At the beginning of the 21st century, the predicted intrusion of the economic 
sphere into society (Bourdieu 1998) has become a reality in many world re-
gions of capitalism. Even system theory is more and more committed to ana-
lyzing the dominance of the economic system (see Schimank 2013). Political 
efforts to combat the economization of the social have subsided in many socie-
ties, which has led to an extension of capitalist power (see Dörre 2009). These 
processes have favored significant shifts in political decision-making processes 
as the political establishment becomes increasingly infiltrated by global market 
dominance (see Crouch 2008). National governments in the European Union 
have to overcome particular discrepancies since they are forced to execute 
supranational decisions but are solely legitimized by their national citizens. 
Ineffective solutions at the European level create the strong impression that 
there is a crisis of legitimacy in EU politics, indeed that the EU is the new “sick 
man of Europe” (see Pew Global Attitudes Project 2013). As a result, national 
politicians profit from the backlash against national regulations, and are put 
under pressure to propose short-term solutions to reestablish institutional trust 
and fulfill the need for social order. One sociological theory that is suited to 
explaining political disenchantment is the anomie concept (originally devel-
oped by Durkheim 1983 [1897]). In Durkheim’s model, citizens witness signif-
icant disruptions to social order (due, for example, to unforeseen high refugee 
streams), which leaves them feeling like uninvolved bystanders in a nation state 
with porous borders. Anomie in contemporary society thus reflects not only the 
violation of societal norms but, most significantly, a relative lack of certainty in 
expectations within a highly differentiated society (see Bohle et al. 1997, 48 et 
seq.). While people with a higher social status remain active in civil society, 
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disadvantaged groups tend to react with increasing apathy. The concept of 
societal malaise can be seen as a broad framework for the current societal situa-
tion, encompassing feelings of political alienation and a lack of political effica-
cy at various levels. Enraged citizens (see Kurbjuweit 2010) at the bottom of 
society share the deeply felt opinion that the complex conditions of an interna-
tionally connected world obstruct the possibility of (progressive) social change. 
It is notable that protest groups (such as Pegida in Germany) resolve to build a 
firewall against “otherness” without presenting constructive solutions. They 
unleash their anger in a defensive way, fueled by powerlessness and a sense of 
exclusion (see Blühdorn 2013, 169). There has been a widespread failure to 
address these far-reaching forms of institutional alienation and to judge them as 
temporary phenomena. The representation crisis of democracy (see Linden and 
Thaa 2011) has already reached a deep level, signaling a post-democratic turn 
in Western societies (see Blühdorn 2013).  
4.3  Social Distrust 
One clear symptom of a developing crisis of cohesion is the rise in social dis-
trust in many European societies. Diminishments in social capital and forms of 
social exclusion are well-known research areas in the field of social cohesion, 
which were prominently addressed by advocates of communitarianism (see 
Taylor 1995; Walzer 1993; Putnam 2000). Individual strategies that undermine 
solidarity result from subordination under the normative goal of achievement, 
since in highly individualized societies (see Münch 2010) all responsibility for 
decision-making is assigned to the individual. People experience a lack of 
freedom (as a paradoxical consequence of high levels of autonomy) as they are 
forced to make decisions and incur debts, but often have no real opportunities 
for advancement within society. In many European societies, the pressure to 
achieve social mobility is growing and the impulse of competition may win out 
over that of solidarity. The egocentric attitude that exists under the shadow of 
neoliberalism is furthered by new processes of cultural uprooting due to institu-
tional alienation and rapid societal change. It is not only economic conditions 
but also political disruptions to order in particular that provoke individual reac-
tions that go hand in hand with widespread feelings of distrust. The issue of 
immigration is mainly responsible for the sharp polarization of values in socie-
ty. Specific groups in society may respect or even appreciate cultural heteroge-
neity, while those in denial of late modern transformations may shift their 
values in a defensive direction. The rejection of cultural diversity results in an 
increased commitment to one´s own nation and a renaissance of social values 
that aim to preserve order by opting for strong leadership and denying egalitar-
ianism and a commitment to tolerance. People tend to simplify the complexity 
of social relations by enhancing the status of the majority ingroup and devalu-
ing the status of marginal outgroups.  
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All these dynamics of societal malaise increase the danger of an erosion of 
solidarity. We particularly witness a rise in ethnocentrism at the bottom of 
society due to the fact that disadvantaged groups choose to defend their precar-
ious wealth by bullying the more underprivileged. Particular groups come into 
the fore, who are judged as “significant others” (Triandafyllidou 1998, 593) 
and perceived as a threat to achievements in Western society, such as equality 
and wealth. Disputes in relation to cultural diversity are expressive of signifi-
cant identity conflicts in contemporary society, which have the potential to 
initiate a new “age of irreconcilability” (Dubiel 1997, 429). That which is for-
eign is perceived as a powerful invader in our ancestral territories, which can 
no longer be protected from the side effects of globalization. The rise in xeno-
phobia is thus a direct consequence of rapid societal transformations in Europe. 
5. Is a Key Consequence of Social Malaise a Rise in 
Ethnocentrism? 
In Europe, individual, sociodemographic, and structural predictors, as well as 
significant attitudes, for explaining and measuring ethnocentrism are the focus 
of important national (see Allbus 1996, 2006 in Germany) and cross-national 
research tools (see ESS 2002, 2014) and have thus been extensively empirically 
documented (for a recent review see Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). Several em-
pirical analyses highlight structural as well as cultural explanations for ethnocen-
trism but the influence of current societal developments is often only taken into 
account through rather imprecise contextual factors (see Billiet, Meulemann and 
De Witte 2014). Following the famous conceptualization of Allport (1954), who 
defined prejudice as an antipathy based upon inflexible generalization, the con-
cept of ethnocentrism is usually seen as an attitude accompanied by negative 
feelings and beliefs held in relation toward different ethnic groups. People try to 
enhance their own social status by devaluating certain marginal outgroups in 
society (see especially social identity theory by Tajfel and Turner 1979). Such 
unilateral worldviews may relieve the individual´s sense of disempowerment, but 
they can have severe consequences for social cohesion.  
Evidence regarding socio-structural and sociodemographic causes of preju-
dice is quite consistent and often replicated in research. The educational level is 
generally identified as one key determinant of prejudice (Hello et al. 2002; 
Coenders and Scheepers 2003) but only a few studies address the question of 
what causal mechanism is responsible for this repeatedly confirmed relation-
ship. In a new study Meeussen, de Vroome, and Hooghe (2013) discovered that 
cognitive skills seem to play a role in coping with social complexity and feel-
ing more secure in different social settings. Higher socioeconomic status is also 
often found to be negatively correlated with prejudice (see Semyonov et al. 
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2004). Another consistent finding is that people who live in urban areas exhibit 
lower levels of prejudice (see Scheepers et al. 2002).  
Duckitt (1992) tries to give a chronological overview of the key theories that 
explain ethnic prejudice. Early approaches were focused on the personality of 
the individual. Authoritarian personality theory (see Adorno et al. 1950) argued 
from the beginning that family dynamics (parental demands for obedience and 
placing a high value on authority and discipline) are directly responsible for 
ethnic prejudice, specifically anti-Semitism. Criticism now challenges the 
psychological reductionism of this theory and its neglect of sociocultural influ-
ences. As Oesterreich (1996) puts it, a modern understanding of authoritarian-
ism should view these tendencies as a pursuit of security and should give the 
societal dimension of authoritarian attitudes more weight. Social dominance 
theory (see Sidanius and Pratto 1999) addresses ethnocentrism more directly 
and highlights the competitive element between ingroups and outgroups. Power 
orientation is a key factor that leads to strong identification with the majority. 
Pettigrew (1998) was one of the first to state that regional and national differ-
ences in the extent of prejudice expressed cannot be fully explained by psycho-
logical characteristics. In his later works, he elaborated the contact theory, 
which was originally developed by Allport (1954). In a recent meta-analysis 
(see Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) it was confirmed that intergroup contact is a 
reliable factor in the reduction of prejudice. But Pettigrew (1998) defined sev-
eral preconditions for this reduction, such as equality of status, both groups 
sharing common goals, and the support of intergroup contact by opinion lead-
ers. Recent studies (see Semyonov and Glikman 2009) even suggest that there 
is a nonlinear relationship between these elements, asserting that anti-minority 
attitudes are lowest in mixed neighborhoods and highest in solely European 
neighborhoods (see Semyonov and Glikman 2009, 701).  
Until the 1960s, other theoretical models, originally developed in social 
psychology, focused on the effect of values on prejudice. The Schwartz (1992) 
value model plays a central role in current cross-national research. While val-
ues of self-transcendence, such as universalism, correspond to positive attitudes 
toward immigrants, traditional values exert a negative influence (see Sagiv and 
Schwartz 1995). This is not surprising, as these values relate to authoritarian-
ism. Davidov et al. (2008) confirmed that these value dimensions have a stable 
influence on ethnocentrism in 19 European states (based on the first wave of 
the ESS 2002), which was also robust after controlling for several other influ-
encing factors.  
In terms of sociological approaches on prejudice, ethnic competition theory 
has grown rapidly in popularity in the past two decades (see Quillian 1995; 
Scheepers et al. 2002; Kunovich 2004; Semyonov et al. 2006). In an influential 
article, Quillian (1995) tried to confirm his group-threat thesis, which states 
that the increasing size of the minority population and deteriorating economic 
conditions contribute to increased feelings of threat and ethnic prejudice. In 
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general, immigrant size is widely used as a contextual predictor and the group-
threat theory has often been confirmed in analyses of the United States (see 
Taylor 1998). However, the results in Europe are more mixed. While Scheepers 
et al. (2002) confirmed that the size of the immigrant population has a positive 
effect on ethnocentrism, Semyonov et al. (2004) found that this factor has no 
effect on negative attitudes toward immigrants in Germany. Additionally, in his 
longitudinal study (Semyonov et al. 2006), he suggests that there was a larger 
effect of group size on prejudice in the 1990s but not in the year 2000.  
Until now the size of the immigrant population and economic conditions are 
the most commonly used group-level indicators to explain ethnic prejudice but 
the results are often controversial. This could be also due to imprecise contex-
tual indicators that are only used at the national level.  
Several studies consistently conclude that economic competition between 
groups might play a smaller role than often assumed and that the threat of cul-
tural diversity (see Raijman et al. 2008) and distance (see Schneider 2008) are 
stronger explanatory factors for ethnic prejudice in Europe (see Sniderman et 
al. 2004). Examples of new approaches include the studies of political climate 
and anti-foreigner sentiment in Europe between 1988 and 2000 (see Semyonov 
et al. 2006), the role of the media in influencing ethnic prejudice and right-
wing voting behavior (see Boomgarden and Vliegenthart 2007), and public 
views concerning the impact of immigrants on crime (see Ceobanu 2011).  
Cross-national research demonstrates that the aforementioned conditions 
considerably influence negative attitudes toward immigrants in Western Euro-
pean states, whereas in the new EU member states only weak explanations are 
found (see Zick, Pettigrew, and Wagner 2008; Coenders and Scheepers 2003; 
Hjerm 2001). According to Kunovich (2004), poorer economic conditions in 
Eastern Europe may affect both lower and higher classes of society, and there-
fore the differentiation of prejudice tends to be weaker. Nyiri (2003) warns 
against viewing Eastern Europe as a homogenously xenophobic region and 
instead highlights that differences between Eastern European countries are as 
significant as those between Eastern and Western European states. Economic 
and cultural explanations are only weak predictors of prejudice in Eastern 
Europe and therefore the focus should be directed more toward the role of 
politics and public discourse (see Nyiri 2003, 30 et seq.).   
This short overview of the most important findings demonstrates that expla-
nations of ethnic prejudice have a long tradition in empirical research. Sophis-
ticated analysis of disintegration processes and societal malaise should inte-
grate new perspectives and aim to take the shifting perspectives of 
contemporary societal transformations in Europe more adequately into account. 
Until now there have been only a few studies that focus on the evolution of 
xenophobic attitudes. Meulemann, Davidov, and Billiet (2009) measured the 
attitudinal change toward immigration between the first three waves of the 
European social survey (2002-2006). They concluded that there is no uniform 
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rise in ethnic prejudice but rather a slight tendency toward more openness in 
relation to immigration, at least in countries with insignificant immigration 
flows and low unemployment rates. Differences between European countries 
have even increased in recent years, which indicate that there is a need to ex-
plore the different societal conditions more closely.  
6.  Research Questions and Sample Characteristics 
The main empirical aims of this article are, first, to empirically confirm a high-
ly diverse picture of European societies (by implementing a cluster analysis), to 
test a multidimensional conception of societal malaise (using structural equa-
tion modelling), to monitor societal change in Europe (by making mean com-
parisons), and to operationalize a broad concept of social integration (based on 
restrictions in objective living conditions and subjective perceptions of crisis) 
to advance a sophisticated measurement for actual causes of ethnocentrism, 
which is implemented by several sequential regression models in separate 
European regions. In general, the empirical study should provide a first explor-
ative test of the theoretical approach, which was presented in the previous 
sections. The whole operationalization process is thus theoretically driven and 
leads to four guiding research questions:  
- First research question: “Is it justified to distinguish between six European 
regions based on statistical data for contemporary economic, political, and 
cultural developments?” This refers solely to the macro-level. It is intended 
to operationalize political impositions, economic inequalities, and cultural 
differences based on comparable data from official statistics (mainly from 
Eurostat) and to evaluate the relevance of the typology that was developed 
in Section 3 (see Figure 2).  
- Second research question: “Is it possible to develop a cross-culturally valid 
measurement of societal well-being vs. malaise based on European survey 
data?” This moves to the micro-level and deals primarily with methodologi-
cal requirements for establishing a new understanding of societal malaise. A 
big challenge for future cross-national research is finding equivalent indica-
tors of societal well-being, which can be used for cross-national compari-
sons. Implementing structural equation modelling and using MGCFA (Multi 
Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis) is a common method of testing for the 
cross-national invariance of the concept (see in detail in Bachleitner, 
Weichbold, Aschauer and Pausch 2014).  
- Third research question: “Has there been an increase in societal perceptions 
of crisis based on the new measurement in recent years in Europe and what 
differences occur between European countries?” This gives initial insights 
into the quality of the concept for monitoring societal well-being in Europe 
from a spatiotemporal perspective. Mean comparisons are used to provide a 
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first overview of which EU countries have experienced a sharp increase in 
societal malaise in recent years or which nations continuously suffer from 
restrictions in societal well-being. 
- Final research question: “Which predictors of social integration (objective 
living conditions and subjective feelings) are able to explain ethnocentrism 
and the differences that occur between major European regions?” This re-
quires the most complex methodological procedures. It was decided to abstain 
from a multilevel analysis in order to maintain the perspective of a highly di-
verse European Union and to put a higher emphasis on specific regional dy-
namics. A comprehensive list of relevant explanatory factors was considered 
so that a sequential multiple regression design could be implemented. All the 
models were controlled for methodical bias (such as multicollinearity and 
missing values) to provide empirically sound evidence about the dynamics of 
societal malaise and ethnocentrism in different European regions.  
While the empirical test of the first research question is based on macro-
indicators (mainly derived from databases of official statistics), the empirical 
analysis concerning the micro-level is based on survey data. Two waves of the 
European Social Survey, currently considered the leading cross-national survey 
in Europe, were used in this study to measure the political and social attitudes 
of citizens. The European Social Survey started as a biannual survey in 2002, 
and the data from the seventh wave was released in October 2015. To analyze 
the effects of the financial crisis and its aftermath in Europe, the third wave in 
2006 has been compared with the sixth wave in 2012.  
The European Social Survey has several advantages compared to other sur-
vey instruments. The data quality fulfils the highest standards in survey re-
search, which is demonstrated by their extensive efforts of documentation, a 
high number of participating European countries (from 22 countries in the first 
wave up to 30 countries in the fourth wave), large probability samples for each 
country (the minimum sample size is 1500), equal survey modes (in the form of 
face-to-face interviews), and a high target response rate (70%) (see Lynn et al. 
2007). Table 1 gives an overview of the sample sizes, fieldwork periods, and 
response rates for all countries that were included in the analysis. The list of 
countries follows the typology of six European regions, which was theoretical-
ly elaborated in Section 3.2. The table illustrates that despite the survey’s high-
quality criteria, comparable fieldwork periods could not be achieved in all 
countries (see Sweden, Denmark, France, Italy, Spain, Lithuania, and Bulgaria 
in 2012, for example). Additionally, the target response rate of 70% is only 
rarely fulfilled. Although the ESS is considered to be the gold standard in 
cross-national research, the results should still be treated with caution since 
complete representativeness and comparability is very hard to achieve in cross-
national survey data (see Bachleitner et al. 2014). 
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Table 1: Overview of Sample Used to Analyze Attitudes of the EU Citizens 
Typology of 
European 
regions 
EU 
members 
Overview of the sample: 2006 Overview of the sample: 2012 
n 
Fieldwork 
period 
(Target: 
1.9.2006-
31.12.2006)
Response 
rate 
(Target: 
70%) 
n 
Fieldwork 
period 
(Target:  
1.9.2012- 
31.12. 
2012) 
Response 
rate (Target: 
70%) 
Social-
democratic 
welfare states 
Sweden   1927 21.09.06-03.02.07 65.9   1847 
01.10.12-
05.05.13 52.4 
Denmark   1505 19.09.06-02.05.07 50.8   1650 
10.01.13-
24.04.13 49.1 
Finland   1896 18.09.06-20.12.06 64.4   2197 
03.09.12-
02.02.13 67.3 
Conservative 
welfare states 
Nether-
lands   1889 
16.09.06-
18.03.07 59.8   1845 
28.08.12-
30.03.13 55.1 
Belgium   1798 23.10.06-19.02.07 61.0   1869 
10.09.12-
24.12.12 58.7 
Austria   2405 18.07.07-05.11.07 64.0    
Germany    2916 01.09.06-15.01.07 54.5   2958 
06.09.12-
22.01.13 33.8 
France   1986 19.09.06-07.04.07 46.0   1968 
08.02.13-
30.06.13 52.1 
Liberal welfare 
states 
United 
Kingdom   2394 
05.09.06-
14.01.07 54.6   2286 
01.09.12-
07.02.13 53.1 
Ireland   1800 14.09.06-31.08.07 56.8   2628 
15.10.12-
09.02.13 67.9 
Mediterranean 
welfare states 
Italy        960 01.06.13-20.12.13 36.0 
Spain   1876 25.10.06-04.03.07 65.9   1889 
23.01.13-
14.05.13 70.3 
Portugal   2222 12.10.06-28.02.07 72.8   2151 
24.10.12-
20.03.13 77.1 
Cyprus     995 02.10.06-10.12.06 67.3   1116 
01.10.12-
31.12.12 76.8 
State-oriented 
corporate 
welfare states 
Slovenia   1476 18.10.06-04.12.06 65.1   1257 
01.10.12-
31.12.12 57.7 
Slovakia   1766 01.12.06-28.02.07 73.2   1847 
24.10.12-
06.03.13 74.1 
Czech 
Republic      2009 
09.01.13-
11.03.13 68.4 
Hungary   1518 21.11.06-28.01.07 66.1   2014 
10.11.12-
17.02.13 64.5 
Poland   1721 02.10.06-13.12.06 70.2   1898 
19.09.12-
08.01.13 74.9 
Neoliberal 
rudimentary 
welfare states 
Estonia   1517 25.10.06-21.05.07 65.0   2380 
01.09.12-
28.01.13 67.8 
Lithuania      2109 21.05.13-25.08.13 49.6 
Bulgaria   1400 20.11.06-10.01.07 64.8   2260 
09.02.13-
30.04.13 74.7 
Total sample (unweighted) 35007   41138  
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7.  Operationalization Strategy for Cross-National 
Comparisons 
As mentioned before, the whole operationalization process is theoretically 
driven and leads on to a comprehensive evaluation of the theoretical model. 
This is clearly illustrated in Figure 3, which gives an overview of all the di-
mensions of analysis, as well as the forms of measurement. Political imposi-
tions, economic inequalities, and cultural insecurities are all measured on the 
macro-level (using context indicators) and generally reflect the temporal, struc-
tural, and cultural processes of change which are the central consequences of 
societal malaise. Apart from these macro-developments, the meso-level (the 
living conditions of citizens within EU member states) has to be taken into 
consideration. Different varieties of capitalism (see Hall and Soskice 2001), 
welfare-state arrangements (see Esping-Andersen 1999), historical conditions 
(see Boatca 2010), as well as political and media discourses function in an 
interface and influence the extent of perceptions of crisis in certain countries. 
The operationalization of citizens’ lack of resources is mainly based on the 
concept of social disintegration developed by Anhut and Heitmeyer (2000). 
The authors propose three crisis states that are highly relevant for European 
citizens: the crisis of regulation may be reflected by a decline in voter turnout 
and political participation; the crisis of social structure manifests itself in rising 
social inequalities; and the crises of cohesion may reflect difficulties in guaran-
teeing social inclusion. These objective processes go hand in hand with various 
perceptions of crisis and form the core concept of societal malaise. It is im-
portant to operationalize feelings of discontent through a multidimensional 
perspective and to include a sophisticated measurement of ethnocentrism as the 
study’s main dependent variable.  
Figure 3: Overview of Explanation Model and Operationalization Strategy 
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7.1  Operationalization of Macro-Indicators 
In the first step, it is necessary to define the key societal conditions that are able 
to indicate political impositions, economic inequalities, and cultural insecurities. 
Table 2 gives an overview of the statistical indicators (based on the year 2012) 
that were used for a cluster analysis of 21 European Union member states.1  
The GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS), the GDP annual 
growth rate, the GINI index, the annual unemployment rate, and the extent of 
poverty and social exclusion were selected to show the economic context in the 
European Union. All measures were derived from Eurostat and reflect key 
indicators of economic development. Current political conditions are represent-
ed through a general measurement of public debt (percentage of GDP) and 
expenditures on social protection (based on PPS per capita).  
All other indicators are based on alternative sources in order to provide 
deeper insight into the state of democracy in various EU countries. The Index 
of Democracy (KID) by Lauth and Kauff (2012) combines data from Freedom 
House, the Polity Project, and selected governance indicators of the World 
Bank (rule of law and political stability) in order to overcome the shortcomings 
of single measures. This index is generally closely related to the Corruption 
Perceptions Index,2 which measures the extent of corruption from a worldwide 
perspective. It was decided to additionally add a measurement for integration 
policy. The Migrant Integration Policy Index is based on the prominent MIPEX 
study,3 which aims to give a general picture of migrants’ opportunities for partic-
ipation in society. The index value is based on 167 diverse indicators, which 
measure integration policies, contextual factors, and integration outcomes.  
The last three macro-indicators deal with cultural diversity between and 
within the countries of the European Union. Cultural heterogeneity within EU 
member states is measured according to the proportion of citizens with immi-
grant backgrounds (based on Eurostat). The other two indicators highlight the 
cultural characteristics of European societies by analyzing their value priorities. 
Schwartz’s value concept (1992) reflects an empirically sound model for basic 
values and is well-suited to cross-national research. Schwartz proposes 10 
individual values that are positioned in a circular arrangement. These values 
form two higher-order bipolar dimensions that present a spectrum with succes-
sive closely related values: the dimension of openness to change (individualis-
tic efforts and action) vs. traditionalism (preservation of the existing order), and 
the dimension of self-enhancement (pursuit of one’s own success and domi-
nance) vs. self-transcendence (acceptance of others as equals). The two bipolar 
                                                             
1  Austria, Greece, Croatia, Latvia, Luxemburg, Malta, and Romania were not included in the 
analysis as these states did not participate in the sixth wave of the European Social Survey.  
2  <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results>. 
3  <http://www.mipex.eu>. 
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dimensions were constructed using ESS data and the national values were 
computed according to Schwartz’s guidelines (2009).  
Table 2: Operationalization of Macro-Indicators 
Levels of Analysis Indicators Data Source 
Economic sphere  
GDP per Capita in PPS Eurostat: Code tec00114 
GDP Growth Rate (compared to 
previous year) Eurostat: Code nama_gdp_k  
GINI Index Eurostat: Code ilc_di12 
Unemployment Rate Eurostat: Code une_rt_a 
Poverty and Social Exclusion Eurostat: Code t2020_50 
Political sphere 
Public Debt Eurostat: Code tsdde410 
Expenditure on Social Protection Eurostat: Code tps00100 
Quality of Democracy (KID) University of Würzburg 
Corruption Perceptions Index  Transparency International 
Integration Policy MIPEX Study <www.mipex.eu> 
Cultural sphere 
Proportion of People with Migra-
tion Background  Eurostat: Code migr_pop3ctb 
Traditionalism vs. Openness to 
Change 
ESS Computation based on 
Schwartz (1992) 
Self-Enhancement vs. Self-
Transcendence 
ESS Computation based on 
Schwartz (1992) 
 
These contextual indicators of societal conditions were used in a cluster analy-
sis to support the theory-driven typology of heterogeneous European regions. 
Three indicators (the unemployment rate, expenditures on social benefits, and 
the Corruption Perceptions Index) are marked in bold as they were not also 
considered in the cluster analysis. This is due to high intercorrelations with 
other indicators: GDP is strongly related to social expenditures (ρ = 0.93); both 
measures of quality of democracy appear interchangeable (ρ = 0.73); and un-
employment is strongly connected to poverty and social exclusion (ρ = 0.76).4  
7.2  Operationalization of Restrictions in Living Conditions 
The selection of indicators to measure individual capacities to achieve social 
integration takes into account several control variables. Besides age and gen-
der, as well as marital status, the number of children in a given household, 
domicile, migration and religious background were also used to show the po-
tential sociodemographic impact factors on ethnocentrism. To differentiate 
clearly between social groups and to highlight contemporary living conditions, 
the study used Anhut and Heitmeyer’s (2000) concept of integration.  
                                                             
4  Using highly correlated indicators is not recommended in cluster analysis since this can have 
a large effect on measures of distance, which are crucial in the formation of homogenous 
groups of countries. 
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- The structural sphere refers to individual-functional system integration and 
covers the resources needed for advancement in society (access to jobs, edu-
cation, and income). Several grades of employment relationships were used 
to assess the structural position of citizens. Apart from the employment sta-
tus of citizens, education, income, and social status (based on the ISEI 
measurement by Ganzeboom and Treiman 2003) were included as objective 
and comparable measurements of structural positions in society. These indi-
cators were supplemented by two subjective measurements that address feel-
ings of belonging to the top or bottom social strata and impressions of 
whether it is easy or difficult to manage with one’s household income.  
- The communicative-interactive social integration measure refers to the 
political sphere and institutional participation. This level is only roughly 
measured using three indicators. The first variable deals with trade union 
membership. Two indices indicate the extent of conventional and unconven-
tional political participation in society (Uehlinger 1988).  
- The cultural-expressive social integration measure is operationalized using 
indicators of formal and informal social engagement (see Putnam 2000). 
One variable refers to involvement in voluntary organizations, while the 
other measure indicates levels of social contact and social inclusion (friend-
ships, intimate relationships, and social activities). Schwartz’s (1992) bipo-
lar value dimensions of were also included at the individual level, as it has 
frequently been found that values exert an influence on ethnocentrism (see 
Davidov et al. 2008).  
All ordinal variables measuring restrictions in living conditions were dichoto-
mized to guarantee unbiased use in sequential multiple regression models.  
Table 3: Overview of Operationalization of Restrictions in Living Conditions 
Level of Analysis Objective Predictors 
Subjective 
Predictors Indicators 
Control variables
(7 indicators) 
Socio-
demogra-
phic factors 
 
˗ Age (ESS Code agea) 
˗ Gender (ESS Code gndr) 
˗ Marital status (ESS Code maritalb) 
˗ Children in household (ESS Code chldhhe) 
˗ Domicile (ESS Code domicil) 
˗ Migration background, part of ethnic minority 
(ESS Codes: brncntr & blgetmg) 
˗ Religious background (ESS Code: rlgdgr) 
Structural 
sphere 
(6 indicators) 
Employment 
status  
˗ Full time job with unlimited contract  
˗ Self-employed (ESS Codes: emplrel & emplno) 
˗ Part-time (<=30h) (ESS Codes: mnactiv & wkhct) 
˗ Temporary contract (ESS Codes: mnactiv & wrk-
ctra)  
˗ Unemployment (ESS Code: mnactic) 
˗ Permanently sick or disabled (ESS Code: mnactic) 
˗ In education (ESS Code: mnactic) 
˗ Housework (ESS Code: mnactic) 
˗ Retired (ESS Code: mnactic) 
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Table 3 continued... 
 
Education 
(ISCED)  
˗ Low education level (ISCED 0-2) 
˗ Middle education level (ISCED 3-4) 
˗ High education level (ISCED 5-7) (ESS Code: 
eisced) 
Income 
social status 
(ISEI) 
 
˗ Income in deciles (ESS Code: hinctnta) 
˗ ISEI for ISCO 08 
<http://www.harryganzeboom.nl> 
 
Subjective 
status  
Managing 
with income
˗ Subjective Top-Bottom Scale (ESS Code: plinsoc) 
˗ Managing with income (ESS Code: hincfel) 
Political sphere  
(3 indicators) 
Trade 
unions  ˗ Membership (ESS Code: mbtru) 
Convention-
al political 
participa-
tion 
 
˗ Contacted a politician (ESS Code: contplp) 
˗ Worked in political party (ESS Code: wrkprty)  
˗ Index of participation (0 = no, 1= at least one 
activity) 
Unconven-
tional  
political 
participa-
tion 
 
˗ Took part in demonstration (ESS Code: pbldmn) 
˗ Signed a petition (ESS Code: sgnptit) 
˗ Boycotted products (ESS Code: bctprd)  
˗ Index of participation (0 = no, 1= at least one 
activity) 
Cultural sphere 
(4 indicators) 
Formal 
social 
capital 
 ˗ Involved in work for voluntary organization (ESS Code: wkvlorg) 
Social  
inclusion  
˗ Meeting with relatives and friends (ESS Code: 
sclmeet) 
˗ Number of people with whom individual can 
discuss intimate matters (ESS Code: inprdsc)  
˗ Taking part in social activities (ESS Code: sclact)  
˗ Index of social inclusion (linear transformation, 
1-7) 
 Value  orientations 
˗ Traditionalism vs. Openness to change 
˗ Self-enhancement vs. Self-transcendence 
7.3  Operationalization of Societal Malaise and Ethnocentrism 
All those indicators that refer to the objective level are enhanced by a multifac-
eted measurement of perceptions of crisis. Societal malaise vs. societal well-
being is conceptualized as a second-order factor constituted by various feelings 
of unease toward society. All measurements belonging to societal well-being 
are again framed by the concept of structural, regulative, and cohesive crisis 
states based on Anhut and Heitmeyer’s approach (2000). Table 4 provides a list 
of all indicators that are used to measure social integration at the subjective 
level in European societies. In total, 14 indicators belonging to different subor-
dinate factors are included in the measurement.  
- Political disenchantment is composed of two first-order factors contributing 
to societal malaise. Political trust represents a classical measurement where 
similar items are used in several cross-national surveys (such as the Europe-
an Values Study and the World Values Survey). A central measurement to 
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capture regulative crisis states in society is dissatisfaction with societal de-
velopments.  
- Structural crisis states are measured by fears of societal decline. The first 
two items refer to future pessimism while the other three predominantly deal 
with individual feelings of recognition in society.  
- A cohesion crisis is operationalized using the concept of social distrust, 
which is measured through three classical items. Mutual trust between indi-
viduals is seen as a key influencing factor in the avoidance of insecurities 
(Kollock 1994).  
Table 4: Operationalization of Societal Perceptions of Crisis and 
Ethnocentrism with ESS Indicators 
Crisis Level Dimensions Indicators 
Crisis of regulation 
(disenchantment) 
Dissatisfaction vs. 
satisfaction with 
societal developments 
˗ Trust in parliament (ESS Code: TRSTPRL) 
˗ Trust in politicians (ESS Code: TRSTPLT) 
˗ Trust in political parties (ESS Code: TRSTPRT)  
(11-point scale from 0 = no trust to 10 = com-
plete trust) 
Political distrust vs. 
political trust 
˗ Satisfaction with economy (ESS Code: STFECO) 
˗ Satisfaction with national government (ESS 
Code: STFGOV) 
˗ Satisfaction with the way democracy works 
(ESS Code: STFDEM) 
(11-point scale from 0 = dissatisfaction to 10 = 
satisfaction) 
Crisis of structure 
(decline) 
Fear of societal decline 
vs. feelings of societal 
progress 
˗ Difficult to be hopeful for the future (ESS 
Code: NHPFTR ) 
˗ Situation of people in country is getting worse 
(ESS Code: LFWRS) 
(5-point scale from 0 = disagree to 10 = agree) 
Lack of recognition vs. 
acknowledgment of 
own talents 
˗ Free to decide how to live my life (ESS Code: 
DCLVLF)  
˗ Feel accomplishment in what I do (ESS Code: 
ACCDNG)  
˗ What I do is valuable and worthwhile (ESS 
Code: DNGVAL) 
(5-point scale from 0 = disagree to 10 = agree) 
Crises of cohesion 
(distrust) 
Social distrust vs. 
social trust 
˗ Most people can be trust-ed (ESS Code: 
PPLTRST) 
˗ Most people try to be fair (ESS Code: PPLFAIR) 
˗ Most of the time people try to be helpful (ESS 
Code: PPLHLP) 
(11-point scale from 0 = no trust to 10 = com-
plete trust) 
Perceptions of an 
ethnic threat vs. 
approval of multicul-
tural society 
˗ Immigration bad or good for country's econo-
my (ESS Code: IMBGECO) 
˗ Country's cultural life undermined or enriched 
by immigrants (ESS Code: IMUECLT) 
˗ Immigrants make country worse or better 
place to live (ESS Code: IMWBCNT) 
(11-point scale from von 0 = left pole to 10 = 
right pole) 
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To answer the last research question and to explore the influence of the various 
indicators on ethnocentrism, the dependent variable “ethnic prejudice” is also 
included in the table. All three items form a short one-dimensional scale that 
points to either perceptions of an ethnic threat or approval of cultural diversity. 
8.  Empirical Results 
8.1  Is it Justified to Identify Six European Regions Based on 
Statistical Data Related to Contemporary Economic, Political, 
and Cultural Developments? 
Table 2 illustrated that 10 out of 13 indicators, which describe the economic, 
political, and cultural conditions of European Union member states, could be 
included in a cluster analysis in order to test the theory-driven identification of 
six European regions. In an ideal case, a cluster analysis allows the grouping of 
countries within homogenous regions based on similar empirical characteris-
tics. Nevertheless, the results of a cluster analysis are always dependent on the 
researcher’s decisions, so it is necessary to give sound reasons for all steps 
taken in the analysis. Due to substantial correlations between the variables, it 
was decided to exclude three indicators (the CPI, the unemployment rate, and 
social expenditures: see Table 2). The different scaling of the indicators and the 
small sample size (21 countries) requires a z-standardization of the indicators 
and a selection of the mode of a hierarchical cluster analysis. The quadratic 
Euclidian distance is taken as an ideal distance measure and the linkage method 
of Ward is generally interpreted as the most empirically sound method to gath-
er particular clusters (Wiedenbeck and Züll 2010, 532). The decision reached 
on the adequate number of clusters is based on a visual interpretation of the 
dendrogram (see Figure 4). This graph standardizes the distances between the 
countries on a scale from 0 to 25 and thus illustrates which countries form 
homogenous groups. If the threshold of a normed distance of 5 is used, it ap-
pears to be a realistic measurement for distinguishing six European regions. 
The first group of countries consists of Belgium, Germany, France, and the 
United Kingdom; Ireland and Cyprus can also be included in the first cluster. 
The second class of countries is represented by the Mediterranean region (Italy, 
Spain, and to some extent Portugal). It is also possible to group the Scandinavi-
an countries together (along with the Netherlands). When Eastern Europe is 
taken into account, notable similarities can be identified between the EU mem-
ber states of Central Eastern Europe (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, and 
Slovakia). Poland forms a fifth cluster, together with the Baltic States, while 
Bulgaria must still be regarded as an outlier. The societal conditions of Bulgar-
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ia differ clearly from other European states, which indicate Bulgaria’s rather 
isolated position as a latecomer to the European Union.5  
Figure 4: Dendrogram of the Cluster Analysis (Quadratic Euclidean Distance 
with Ward’s Linkage) 
 
 
Fromm (2012) recommends justifying the typology of countries and securing 
the homogeneity of the cluster through an observation of the distribution of 
clusters compared to the total sample. Following Fromm’s recommendation, 
Table 5 details the mean values and gives clear insights into the economic, 
political, and cultural circumstances in the European Union. The highest GDP 
can be observed in Scandinavia and the Netherlands, closely followed by 
Western European countries. Southern European countries occupy the third 
position, although most of the countries are still exposed to economic decline 
in the aftermath of the economic crisis. Therefore, lower levels of economic 
wealth in Eastern Europe have to be put into the perspective of higher econom-
ic growth rates during recent years. Only Bulgaria still has a very low econom-
ic performance and clearly lags far behind compared to the other states.  
                                                             
5  It is notable that also broader classifications of Europe seem plausible. A threshold of 10 allows 
the separation of the prosperous European region of Scandinavia and the Netherlands from 
the slightly lower standards of living in Continental and Southern Europe. Eastern European 
countries are still situated in the peripheral zone of the European community of states. A 
threshold of 15 allows a clear distinction between Western Europe and Eastern Europe. 
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Table 5: Mean Values of Indicators in Relation to Clusters of European Regions 
 
Scandina-
via and 
the 
Nether-
lands (DK, 
SE, FI, NL) 
Western 
Europe 
and 
Cyprus 
(FR, DE, 
BE, UK, IE, 
CY) 
Southern 
Europe (IT, 
PT, ES) 
Central 
Eastern 
Europe (SI, 
SK, CZ, 
HU) 
Poland 
and the 
Baltic 
States (PL, 
EE, LT) 
Bulgaria 
(BG) Total 
GDP per 
Capita in PPS 123 ,50 112 ,67 90,67 77,00 70,00 47,00 95,57 
GDP Growth 
Rate (previous 
year) 
- ,42 - ,22 -2,40 -,85 3,40 ,60 -,13 
GINI Index 26 ,05 29 ,85 33,80 25,20 31,80 33,60 29,26 
Poverty and 
Social 
Exclusion 
16 ,70 23 ,58 27,80 21,98 27,53 49,30 24,36 
Public Debt 52 ,15 94 ,30 112,37 58,28 35,30 18,40 69,95 
Quality of 
Democracy 
(KID) 
9 ,70 8 ,90 8,27 8,73 8,80 7,30 8,84 
Integration 
Policy 69 ,50 54 ,50 70,00 46,75 44,33 45,00 56,19 
Migration 
Background 10 ,18 14 ,98 10,20 5,48 7,53 1,20 9,85 
Traditionalism 
vs. Openness 
to Change  
,09 - ,25 -,56 -,49 -,59 -1,00 -,36 
Self-
Enhancement 
vs. Self-
Transcendence 
1 ,60 1 ,43 1,30 ,78 ,86 ,79 1,21 
 
The indicators of social inequality, and poverty and social exclusion largely 
confirm the notion of precarious economic states, particularly in Southern 
Europe and some Eastern European states (principally in Bulgaria). Wider gaps 
between the rich and the poor are more effectively absorbed in Scandinavia and 
in Central Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the quality of democracy is 
clearly higher in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe. In particular, South-
ern Europe is more exposed to political instability and a higher level of corrup-
tion, which leads to the lowest mean value in comparison with all the other 
groups of countries (except Bulgaria). These lower levels of democracy in 
Southern Europe are connected with extraordinarily high rates of public debt. 
This clearly indicates that Southern Europe has lost ground compared to the 
other European regions in the aftermath of the economic crisis. Public debt is 
also significantly higher in Western Europe and equally high in Scandinavia in 
comparison with the Eastern European clusters. Additionally, notable discrep-
ancies are found with regard to integration policy. While political measures 
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seem to increase the amount of change immigrants experience, particularly in 
Scandinavia and Southern Europe, there is a lot of room for improvement in 
integration outcomes in Continental and Eastern Europe. The hesitation to 
provide equal opportunities for immigrants could be due to high rates of cultur-
al diversity, particularly in Western Europe. While some Eastern European 
states (especially Poland or Bulgaria) can still be characterized as rather ho-
mogenous societies, the whole Western hemisphere of the European Union in 
particular is more and more exposed to immigration and cultural diversity. This 
long history of multiculturalism may also have left an imprint on cultural val-
ues. According to the Schwartz value model, it can be clearly observed that 
Scandinavian countries (together with the Netherlands) are the leading coun-
tries in terms of progressive values and stand out for their clear orientation 
toward tolerance and equality. The value priorities seem to be somewhat simi-
lar in Western Europe, while people in Southern Europe express a higher orien-
tation toward conservative values. A sharp decrease in values of self-
transcendence can be observed in Eastern Europe. People there tend more often 
to possess a materialist orientation (opting more strongly for achievement and 
power) and to refrain from values of equality and tolerance.  
The main aim of the cluster analysis was to empirically confirm the theory-
driven establishment of six diverse European regions. The first research ques-
tion can largely be answered positively, since all the proposed regions of Eu-
rope were widely confirmed by the cluster analysis. When we compare the 
theoretical model with the empirical results, only a few small deviations ap-
pear. The Netherlands seem to exhibit large economic, political, and cultural 
similarities to Scandinavia. It is also not possible to distinguish between a 
cluster of conservative Western welfare states and liberal welfare countries. 
This is perhaps due to economic and political similarities between Continental 
Europe and the United Kingdom. The most important deviation is reflected in 
the position of Cyprus, which was classified together with Western European 
states in the cluster analysis. This is due to large discrepancies between Cyprus 
and Southern Europe with regard to various selected indicators. Cyprus has a 
larger proportion of people with immigrant backgrounds and its integration 
policy is far more critical compared to other Southern European states.  
In Eastern Europe the distinction between certain groups of countries con-
verges largely with Kollmorgen’s model (2009). The Visegrad states – together 
with Slovenia – form a homogenous group of countries, although Poland seems 
to have more similarities to the Baltic states. Apart from those groups of countries 
that were classified as neoliberal by Kollmorgen, Bulgaria occupies an isolated 
position. This confirms his argument for grouping Bulgaria together with other 
South-Eastern European states as a rudimentary welfare state where state actors 
and institutions still play a dominant role (see Kollmorgen 2009, 84). 
The cluster analysis clearly supports the center-periphery perspective on 
structures in Europe (see Vobruba 2007) and strengthens the view on the exist-
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ence of highly diverse regions, not only with regard to welfare-state systems 
but also concerning democratic achievements and cultural characteristics. Due 
to small deviations between the proposed categories and the cluster results, the 
decision has been reached to maintain the theory-driven model (see Figure 2) 
for further analyses.  
8.2  Is it Possible to Develop a Valid Cross-Cultural Measurement 
of Societal Well-Being vs. Societal Malaise Based on European 
Survey Data? 
The following empirical analysis evaluates the empirical model for societal 
well-being. The multidimensional measurement can be seen as second-order 
model, since it is composed of five first-order factors (political trust, satisfac-
tion with society, future optimism, feelings of recognition, and social trust) that 
all contribute to societal well-being. A factor analysis that confirms this struc-
ture of relations, based on the total individual sample, is illustrated in Figure 5. 
If one evaluates the general fit measures shown at the bottom of the figure, the 
coefficient Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA = 0.035) and 
the Comparative Fit Index (CFI = 0.986) are well below or above the necessary 
criteria (RMSEA<0.05 and CFI >0.90 respectively) (see Hu and Bentler 1999). 
The chi² remains too high to achieve an adequate model fit, but this indicator is 
sensitive to large sample sizes and is therefore hardly used in cross-national 
survey research (see Cheung and Rensvold 2002).  
The results of the first-order factors measuring structural, regulative, and 
cohesive crisis states lead to high-factor loadings and to a clear empirical dis-
tinction between the different levels.6 All loadings of the indicators are above 
0.5 (except one item loading of feelings of recognition), which demonstrates a 
high-quality measurement of the latent variables. Also, the correlations with the 
higher-order factor of societal malaise vs. social well-being are generally sub-
stantial. Impressions of societal functioning are closely related to those of satis-
faction with society, future optimism, and political and social trust. There is 
only one weaker correlation between feelings of recognition and societal well-
being. This is plausible, since recognition corresponds more directly to the 
individual level. 
                                                             
6  Otherwise, some high-error correlations between the factors appear. From a theoretical 
standpoint, it can be argued that trust (on the personal and political level) correlates with a 
general satisfaction with societal developments. 
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Figure 5: Factor Analysis Confirming Concept of Societal Well-Being 
 
Note: Based on total EU sample, 2012. 
 
Besides evaluating the empirical quality of the model, it is additionally im-
portant to test for cross-national equivalence. The same model of societal well-
being should converge in every nation state. This precondition allows a com-
parison of means over time and across nations. The cultural invariance test is 
often done using the method of Multi-Group Confirmatory Analysis 
(MGCFA). According to Chen, Sousa, and West (2005) measurement invari-
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ance should be tested at different levels. The first step of invariance testing is 
configural equivalence. This means that the same items should belong to the 
construct in every single country, but the factor loadings can differ. The second 
level of equivalence is achieved if the loadings of each item on the underlying 
first-order factors can be considered equal. In second-order models it is neces-
sary to test for the factor loadings on the higher-order factors as well. There-
fore, full metric invariance can only be reached if all first- and second-order 
factors constrained as equal lead to a sufficient model fit of the data. If this 
stage of metric equivalence is achieved, relations between the construct and 
other variables can be tested, and it is therefore allowed to use the operationali-
zation of societal well-being for regression analysis. However, the latent means 
of the underlying concepts can only be compared if scalar equivalence is ful-
filled. To test for scalar invariance, the intercepts of the items and factors are 
constrained as equal. Recent methodological articles (see Davidov et al. 2014) 
clearly demonstrate that full scalar invariance is barely fulfilled in cross-
national research. Thus several authors suggest testing for partial scalar invari-
ance. They claim that releasing the equality constraints on a small number of 
indicators does not necessarily degrade the quality of mean comparisons be-
tween countries (see Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998; Davidov 2010). 
Table 6: Evaluation of Cross-National Equivalence (Fit Indices Based on MGCFA) 
Sample Equivalence test 
Chi2 based models Global fit indices 
Chi2 df Chi2 / df Sig. 
RMSE
A pclose CFI 
21 EU countries 
2012 (Model 5: 
release of 
intercept 
invariance 
concerning 
items 
1,3,4,6,8,9,11,12,
14) 
Configural 
invariance 
(Model 1) 
5821,4 1344 4,33 <0,001 0,009 1,000 0,980 
Metric invari-
ance (Model 2, 
first-order 
factor loadings) 
7288,3 1524 4,78 <0,001 0,010 1,000 0,974 
Metric invari-
ance (Model 3: 
first- and 
second-order 
factor loadings) 
8055,6 1604 5,02 <0,001 0,010 1,000 0,971 
Full scalar 
invariance 
(Model 4) 
41791,1 1884 22,2 <0,001 0,023 1,000 0,819 
Partial scalar 
invariance 
(Model 5) 
24371,7 1704 14,30 <0,001 0,018 1,000 0,897 
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To assess and evaluate the different stages of equivalence, various quality of fit 
measures are used in literature.7 To assess the fit of the five models, the changes 
in the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) were analyzed. According to Cheung and 
Rensfold (2002), a difference larger than 0.1 in the CFI value indicates a substan-
tial change in model fit. Applying that rule, metric invariance concerning at least 
the first- and second order factors could be achieved in a cross-national compari-
son of 21 countries. This confirms that the factor loadings between factors and 
items are similar across different nations (see Vandenberg and Lance 2000). But 
there is a clear decrease of the CFI value in model 4 and model 5. It was neither 
possible to reach full scalar equivalence nor partial scalar invariance, which is a 
necessary precondition for comparing the means between countries. But it was 
possible to establish partial scalar invariance within at least most of the European 
regions and also over time (between the two survey waves) in most of the coun-
tries (see Aschauer 2016 for further computations).  
8.3  Is There an Increase of Societal Perceptions of Crisis Based on 
the New Measurement during Recent Years in Europe and 
What Differences Occur between European Countries? 
The third part of the empirical analysis provides a descriptive insight into con-
temporary trends of societal well-being in European countries. All 14 indica-
tors measuring societal functioning were aggregated within two indices. The 
first mean value is computed based on political distrust, political dissatisfac-
tion, and fears of societal decline to analyze the rise of societal perceptions of 
crisis during recent years. The second index value refers to trust in social rela-
tions. It combines the items of social trust with individual feelings of recogni-
tion. This procedure for monitoring societal change based on the attitudes of 
citizens should draw attention to important societal developments in Europe. It 
is assumed that many states are currently confronted with a deep crisis in polit-
ical trust. Several authors additionally fear that this representation crisis in 
democracy (see Linden and Thaa 2011) may affect trust in social relations and 
proceed to a crisis of cohesion (see Heitmeyer 2010). Figures 6 to 9 permit 
initial hypotheses on the evolution of societal malaise from 2006 till 2012. 
Both country-wide indices are illustrated by their scale means (based on the 
combination of items that belong to the relevant first-order factors).8  
                                                             
7  The chi-squared difference test is often used and should lead to insignificant changes 
between the models. On the other hand, the chi2 test is sensitive to large sample sizes and is 
not recommended for ESS data.  
8  Most of the indicators were evaluated by the citizens on an 11-point scale (from 0 to 10). 
All items that employ a different scale were adapted to those scales through linear transfor-
mation. The values in the figure can thus be seen as average values for societal well-being at a 
specific time point. Country means below five (the middle of the scale) indicate societal per-
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The figure on the upper left shows the continuous rise of a societal malaise 
even in Western and Northern Europe. There are only four countries left in the 
year 2012 with a level of trust and satisfaction above the scale mean of 5. 
These countries are Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and the Netherlands. While 
societal well-being appears to be increasing in Sweden, there is a slight down-
ward trend in Finland. Also in Denmark and the Netherlands, the most recent 
data from 2012 shows a decrease in societal functioning compared to the year 
2006. The other Western European countries clearly rank behind in this respect 
and achieve a mean value between 3.5 and 4.5 (see Figure 6). 
Figure 6: Trust in Society: 2006 and 2012 (Northern and Western Europe) 
 
Figure 7: Trust in Social Relations: 2006 and 2012 (Northern and Western 
Europe) 
 
                                                                                                                                
ceptions of crisis (as people tend to voice feelings of dissatisfaction or distrust in social rela-
tions) while mean values above five reflect the relatively positive judgements of citizens. 
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Figure 8: Trust in Society: 2006 and 2012 (Eastern and Southern Europe) 
 
Figure 9: Trust in Social Relations: 2006 and 2012 (Southern and Eastern Europe) 
 
 
Belgium and Germany occupy roughly the same position, although both states 
were confronted with different developments. Belgium faced an increase in 
societal malaise during recent years, while Germany was able to enhance the 
societal well-being of its citizens. The level of perceptions of crisis seems to be 
growing slightly in the United Kingdom and in France as well. The sharp de-
crease of societal well-being in Ireland is a clear example of how economic 
difficulties can cause dramatic changes in citizen’s attitudes and how social 
integration is threatened by economic downturns. On the other hand, Figure 7 
clearly demonstrates that – at least in the year 2012 – there is no evident crisis 
of cohesion in Northern and Western European states. People express a high 
amount of social trust and normally feel appreciated within society. Thus social 
trust and recognition is still widely guaranteed in Western Europe as all coun-
tries achieve a scale mean far above the threshold of 5. It is notable, however, 
that feelings of recognition and social trust have changed slightly in Ireland, the 
only country in Western Europe that was dramatically affected by the econom-
ic crisis in the year 2009.  
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If Eastern and Southern Europe are taken into consideration, sharp declines 
of trust in society (see Figure 8) can be observed. In particular, the economic 
difficulties of Cyprus, Spain, and Portugal are clearly reflected in the data on 
societal well-being. Portugal and Bulgaria have sustained low levels of societal 
satisfaction over the last few years, while Spain and Cyprus experienced a rapid 
rise in societal perceptions of crisis due to the European debt crisis. Also in East-
ern Europe, the global financial crisis had significant negative impacts on societal 
well-being in most of its constituent countries. There are only two notable excep-
tions: Poland and Hungary can mainly be characterized by positive develop-
ments, and particularly Hungary seemed to recover in 2012 from high-level per-
ceptions of crisis in 2006. The financial crisis has exerted a strong negative effect 
on societal functioning in Slovenia and the Czech Republic. It is striking that 
many countries only achieve a scale mean between 2 and 3, reflecting high 
levels of general dissatisfaction with societal developments.  
This crisis of institutional trust is again not connected with a crisis of trust in 
social relations (see Figure 9). Although most of the Southern and Eastern Euro-
pean states rank behind Northern and Western European countries, the amount of 
social trust and feelings of recognition is still within a mean range of 5 to 6.5, 
indicating a functioning level of cohesion. Societal well-being seems to be threat-
ened at the institutional level but not at the level of social relations. It is clearly 
apparent that those countries that have suffered most from the economic crisis are 
also often affected by a decrease in social trust. This problematic constellation 
of societal malaise is still observable in Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Portugal.  
8.4  Which Predictors of Social Integration (Objective Living 
Conditions and Subjective Feelings) are Able to Explain 
Ethnocentrism and What Differences Occur between Major 
European Regions? 
The last part of the empirical analysis turns back to the micro-level and tries to 
explore the link between restrictions in contemporary living conditions and 
societal perceptions of crisis and ethnocentrism. Due to the heterogeneous 
constellations in Europe, it is imperative to take cross-national differences 
sufficiently into account. To achieve a comprehensive view of European socie-
ties it was decided to compute separate sequential multiple regressions for all 
six European regions that were theoretically extrapolated in the article (see 
Figure 2). All models are computed based on regional samples of social-
democratic welfare states (SE, FI, DK), conservative welfare states (BE, DE, 
NL, FR), liberal welfare states (GB, IE), Mediterranean welfare states (IT, ES, 
PT, CY), state-oriented corporate welfare states (SI, SK, CZ, PL, HU), and 
neoliberal-rudimentary welfare states (EE, LT, BG). To control for additional 
country effects, the first regression model only includes each individual coun-
try (as dummy variables) within the regions. The second model deals with 
HSR 41 (2016) 2  │  345 
country effects and sociodemographic predictors. The third model integrates 
the political and cultural explanations, and the fourth model additionally con-
siders structural parameters. Model 5 adds the five first-order factors of societal 
malaise to the explanation of ethnocentrism. Model 6 additionally uses the 
income categories and the ISEI values, and simultaneously controls for missing 
values. All regressions were computed based on the listwise procedure, which 
is still seen as a robust method to control for artefacts in regression analysis 
(see Allison 2002, 7).9 Only the final models are illustrated in Table 7.10  
If we look at the r² values of the first models, country effects appear in con-
tinental Western Europe, where Germany is more tolerant toward immigrants 
and Belgium is more critical toward cultural diversity in comparison to the Neth-
erlands (reference country). Large country differences are visible in Central East-
ern Europe and in the Mediterranean countries. People in Spain, Italy, and Portu-
gal are much more in favor of cultural diversity in comparison to Cyprus and 
particularly Polish citizens, who largely share positive attitudes toward immi-
grants in comparison to the other countries. The inclusion of societal perceptions 
of crisis markedly increases the effect sizes in Western Europe, while they only 
weakly contribute to the explanation of ethnocentrism in Eastern Europe.  
It is possible to explain about one third of the variance in ethnocentrism by all 
predictors, but the effect sizes are again considerably lower in Eastern Europe.  
The impact of sociodemographic indicators on ethnocentrism is rather weak 
in all countries, especially if all other explanatory factors are included in the 
models. Age exerts only a small influence, with elderly people being more 
critical toward immigrants in Bulgaria and the Baltic states. Domicile has 
marked impact on ethnocentrism in Western Europe, where people in large 
cities are more tolerant in comparison to citizens who live in the countryside. It 
is obvious that people with a migration background largely share positive opin-
ions about ethnic diversity with people who migrate to Europe.  
 
 
                                                             
9  In many regions the sample size of the regression analysis dropped considerably when 
income and status was taken into account. Model 6 was only considered if the deviations 
between Model 5 and 6 were negligible.  
10  Due to the high number of missing values with regard to income and ISEI, it was decided to 
disregard those explanatory factors in the Eastern European countries and to illustrate 
model 5.  
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In terms of the political and cultural level, the impact of value orientation is 
also confirmed in this study. This effect on ethnic prejudice can be viewed as 
stable across all regions. People who favor openness to change and who give 
higher priority to equality and tolerance (instead of self-enhancement) demon-
strate more positive opinions in relation to cultural diversity. Citizens who 
respond to societal challenges through unconventional political engagement 
also tend to favor cultural diversity. The educational gap within anti-immigrant 
sentiment is still clearly observable in Western Europe, but the effect sizes are 
smaller in Southern and Eastern Europe. Interestingly, the lowest effect of 
education on these sentiments was observed in the Mediterranean countries. 
Also the effect of social status (based on the ISEI measurement) is widely 
confirmed in all regions where this variable was considered.  
It is striking, however, that all dimensions of societal malaise clearly exert 
the strongest influence on ethnocentrism and seem to be predominantly rele-
vant for explaining perceptions of ethnic threat. Social trust is a particularly 
stable predictor in all analyzed countries of the European Union. It is especially 
the case in Western Europe that dissatisfaction with societal developments and 
political distrust is additionally related to ethnocentrism. While feelings of 
recognition are not connected with ethnic prejudice, fears of societal decline 
are especially relevant in the liberal welfare states but exert only a low influ-
ence in other European regions.  
9.  Discussion and Conclusion 
The main aim of this article was to present a theory-driven model of societal 
malaise and to introduce a new phenomenon of significant divisions in societal 
trust and societal belonging as a prominent feature of contemporary crisis states 
in Europe. Another important task was to empirically evaluate new divisions 
that have arisen within and between European Union member states and to 
apply a comprehensive empirical perspective to crucial societal developments 
in Europe, restrictions in contemporary living conditions, subjective expres-
sions of societal well-being, and potential societal consequences of those rapid 
processes of social change. The current social turbulence in Europe can be 
roughly characterized by social inequalities, political impositions, and cultural 
insecurities. It has to be stated that the economic divisions between European 
states and rising social inequalities within EU member states have led to a 
negative image of the European integration process and to public impressions 
of a renewed colonialization of the continent’s lifeworlds by neoliberalism (see 
Habermas 1973). It is assumed that at least the victims of these societal trans-
formations experience severe deficits in recognition (see Honneth 1992) and 
that the middle classes also react with fears of societal decline (see Kraemer 
2010). The futility of politics to combat these economic impacts has been in-
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terpreted on a general level as a growing helplessness and increasing power-
lessness, which strongly creates the impression that political impositions are 
negatively affecting Europe. EU citizens thus express high levels of political 
disenchantment and raise deep concerns about future societal developments.  
During recent years, there has been a shift away from GDP so as to assess 
social progress according to quality of life by not only including classical sub-
jective measures, such as happiness and life satisfaction, but also indicators of 
societal well-being (see Glatzer 2008; Harrison, Jowell and Sibley 2011). In the 
sociology of Europe, there are also demands to look more closely at the micro-
level and highlight future challenges of social integration (see Bach 2008; 
Vobruba 2009). Consequently, it is one of the principal future challenges in 
comparative research to take European citizens’ subjective perceptions of crisis 
more adequately into account, to monitor societal well-being over time, and to 
search for comparable and equivalent indicators of this concept. The multidi-
mensional model of societal well-being is a first major step in this direction. 
The results of the cross-national invariance test in this study seem promising, 
as at least metric invariance (meaning the acceptance of a model with equal 
factor loadings across several European countries) could be achieved. The 
heterogeneous results of the mean comparisons suggest that there is no unidi-
rectional path toward perceptions of crisis in Europe and that the nation-state 
still plays a crucial role in mitigating the effects of crises on citizens. The theo-
ry-driven system of differentiating European welfare statues was largely con-
firmed by the cluster analysis. It is based on the varieties of capitalism ap-
proach (see Hall and Soskice 2001), combines welfare-state research (see 
particularly Schröder 2013), and tries to integrate the new post-socialist types 
of regime in Eastern Europe (see Kollmorgen 2009). The empirical cluster 
analysis, which was conducted to confirm impressions of the existence of high-
ly diverse European regions, even extends those views. It was clearly visible 
that welfare-state regimes (see Esping-Andersen 1999) and historical condi-
tions (see Boatca 2010) influence the formation of basic cultural values and 
indicate a high level of cultural diversity within Europe that cannot be easily be 
dismissed through reference to the spill-over effects of European integration 
(see original findings of Haas 1958). It is notable that Eastern European coun-
tries still express a high degree of materialist values and perform lower in self-
transcendence, which confirms the initial idea of an epigonic East trying to 
catch up with the economic wealth of Western Europe (see Boatca 2010). 
Within the reality of large divisions within Europe, Euroscepticism is moving 
into mainstream discourse (see Brack and Startin 2015) and increasingly divid-
ed societies should be seen as a real challenge to enhancing and guaranteeing 
European solidarity.  
It was possible to empirically confirm the evolution of a societal malaise in 
European countries that ran in parallel to the economic crisis. The descriptive 
results based on mean comparisons demonstrate that societal causes (such as 
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political transformations, economic inequalities, and broad insecurities) have 
the potential to gradually erode societal functioning. Although societal disturb-
ances may not be clearly visible yet, there is danger in underestimating societal 
changes in countries trying to overcome certain crisis states (see Streeck 2013, 
14). In particular, trust in society is disappearing in many countries, and we are 
already witnessing a gathering crisis of institutional trust, particularly in South-
ern Europe and in some Eastern European countries. A promising sign from the 
temporal comparison is that there appeared to be no cross-over effects on trust 
in social relations until 2012. On the other hand, it has to be assumed that the 
impacts of the refugee crisis in particular have further intensified the extent of 
the societal malaise. This new unsolved challenge for Europe may particularly 
affect levels of social trust and cohesion in society. Thus it has to be feared that 
societal dissatisfaction is growing larger, transgressing borders, and manifest-
ing itself in intercultural distrust and radicalization.  
The last research question addresses the challenge of ethnocentrism, which 
is a clear consequence of impressions of a societal malaise. A sophisticated 
regression analysis, which takes into account the diverse dynamics within 
European regions, aimed to directly link social destabilization with ethnocen-
trism. A comprehensive list of predictors included country effects, sociodemo-
graphic characteristics, restrictions in living conditions (objective level), and 
specific feelings of discontent (subjective level). It was possible to confirm 
various findings concerning ethnocentrism in cross-national research and to 
provide new evidence in relation to societal perceptions of crisis. The positive 
age effect on ethnocentrism (see Chandler and Tsai 2001) seems less signifi-
cant and could only be found in the Baltic States and Bulgaria. It is notable that 
low levels of education mixed with feelings of malaise exert a high influence 
on perceptions of an ethnic threat in particular in Western Europe, while in the 
Eastern European countries the explanatory power of these factors is consider-
ably lower (see also Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Hjerm 2001). The dimen-
sions of societal well-being that were included in the models clearly confirm 
that the diverse attitudes of citizens (primarily in Western European states) 
lead, to a certain extent, to a polarization of values where societal threats (such 
as cultural diversity) are major sources of dissent. The widening gaps between 
social groups in European societies have to be considered as a future threat to 
social integration. It can also be predicted that these gaps may grow even wider 
in Eastern Europe as the new European Union member states become more and 
more involved in the European challenges of cultural diversity. The rise in hate 
crimes and arson attacks against facilities for asylum seekers clearly indicate 
these new tendencies of a barbarous civicness (see Bauman 2008). Defensive 
solutions have the potential to gradually erode fundamental European values 
and democratic achievements. It is, therefore, more important than ever to 
monitor processes of social change and comprehend the general pessimistic 
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mood in European society, which should neither be neglected in research nor 
underestimated in political conceptions of a united Europe. 
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